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Abstract. The study analyses the potential effects of the Treaty on the Hungarian Constitution 
and its application by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and  the more general–and at the 
European Law’s present stage of the development unavoidable–problem of the theoretical 
analysis of European Law as a branch of law. 
 The study points out that the Hungarian Constitution’s Accession Clause (Article 2/A) 
has not solved the problem of the primacy of Community Law, as far as the relationship be-
tween EU Law and the Hungarian Constitution is concerned, therefore the Constitutional Court 
encounters a problem that is increasingly difficult to resolve, when facing issues relating to the 
incompatibility of Hungarian statutes with EU Law. The study criticises some solutions  
proposed by the Constitutional Treaty (e.g. the institution of  “recommendations”–(the present 
practice of “guidelines” etc.) which is definitely unconstitutional according to the Hungarian 
Constitution and its application practice by the Constitutional Court. Finally the study 
complements the problems thus outlined with the fact that the concept of EU Law and its 
various parts have not been clarified from a dogmatic perspective–the time has come to 
systematize this enormous material of law, especially when a Constitutional Treaty makes 
the attempt to summarize the legal fundaments of the unprecedented effort to develop an 
economic and political integration in Europe.  
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I. The current problems facing the Constitutional Court with respect  
 to the application of European law∗∗ 
 
The application of European law confronts the regular courts the Constitutional 
Court, as well as the Hungarian lawmakers with new challenges. One year after 
EU accession some focal points are beginning to emerge which will or may 
become placed in a new context with the adoption of the TCE. We conceive of 
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the application of European law in two ways: for one application by lawmakers 
and then by law enforcement and the judiciary. In the former case we refer to a 
very particular instance of legal application, specifically the domestic trans-
position of current directives or of future European framework law. This, though 
it completely differs in nature from traditional legal application in this particular 
European legal context, is undoubtedly (also) legal application in the context 
of the sui generis European legal order. The lawmaker creates domestic law by 
simultaneously applying European law.  
 1. The application of European law has reached the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court already. Decisions have been handed down in two cases already, 
though in both cases the court specifically investigated the compatibility of 
Hungarian legal acts with the Hungarian constitution, and emphatically did not 
look at the issue of compatibility with European law–either through reviewing 
the validity of a directive or the adequacy of implementation 17/2004 (V. 25.) 
Constitutional Court decision (ABH 2004, 296–297); 744/B/2004 Decision of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court, Alkotmánybíróság Határozatai, 2005, No. 
2, 81]. The connection with European law stemmed from the fact that in the 
first case the issue revolved around the implementation of an EU regulation, 
while in the second case a European directive served as the basis for drafting 
the Hungarian legal act in question.  
 Moreover, as a result of two motions the Constitutional Court was recently 
faced with the task of adjudging the constitutionality of a Hungarian legal act 
on the basis of European law, to determine the compatibility of the former with 
the latter (no decision has been rendered as of Spring 2006).  
 2. In one case the issue is the faulty transposition of a directive–a directive 
on company law. The directive seeks to achieve that member states liberalise 
the rules and conditions for increasing the capital of public limited-liability 
companies. The lawmaker–obviously as a result of a translation error–amended 
Act CXLIV (Companies Act) of 1997 on commercial companies, but due to 
the presumable misunderstanding of the directive the regulation not only failed 
to become laxer, but in fact become extremely prohibitive, so that in effect it is 
more or less impossible to increase capital. The result is thus a transposition 
that is not compatible with the directive, is in fact contradictory to it. The 
Hungarian lawmaker therefore not only failed to fulfil its legislative duty, but 
in fact further restricted the regulation–effectively moving it away from its 
stated objective. 
 According to European law a faulty implementation can be corrected if a 
court requests a preliminary judgment from the ECJ in the context of a legal 
suit, noting the incompatibility of Hungarian and European law. On the basis 
of the ECJ’s verdict the court may then render the given statute ineffective. 
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Parties whose interests are violated can of course also turn to the Commission, 
asking it to take measures to remedy the situation.  
 In the case at hand the first possibility did not even arise, since due to specifics 
of the case the commercial parties involved had intensive and good co-operation 
and therefore a legal dispute did not arise. More importantly, the ECJ’s practice 
does not recognise the direct horizontal effect of a directive. The second venue 
is more of a theoretical possibility that will yield results only very slowly, if 
the Commission decides to intervene at all.  
 Thus the corporation turned to the Constitutional Court with the motion to 
declare the statute unconstitutional and to thus render it void, on the basis that 
the Hungarian legal regulation is not compatible with European law (the 
directive).  
 Nevertheless, the Accession Clause contained in Article 2/A of the Consti-
tution does not touch upon compatibility with European law, but rather creates 
the constitutional possibility of transferring the exercise of certain competencies. 
It does not refer to the issue of supremacy of European law over Hungarian 
legal order, and most definitely not to the formers’ relation to the Constitution 
and its respective supremacy.  
 Given that the Companies Act will be repealed by the entering into force of 
the new company law, the proceedings are likely to be halted.  
 3. In another case members of parliament turned to the Constitutional 
Court regarding the amendment of Act LVIII of 2001 on the central bank. The 
amendment changed the rules concerning the nomination of members of the 
monetary board, dividing the right to nominate between the president of the 
National Bank and the prime minister. The petitioners do not claim that the 
amendment conflicts with the Hungarian Constitution’s provisions on the central 
bank in Article 32/D, but they claim that the change is in direct conflict with 
the TEC’s Article 108, which in their interpretation mandates the absolute 
independence of central banks in member states. Petitioners further request 
that the Constitutional Court, before rendering a verdict turn, to the ECJ with a 
preliminary question concerning the issue of compatibility.  
 Here the Hungarian Constitutional Court must again decide on the compati-
bility of Hungarian law with European law, even though the Constitution does 
not proscribe anything concerning the primacy of European law. As unlike the 
regular courts the Hungarian Constitutional Court only and exclusively decides 
on the basis of the Constitution, and does not consider the whole of Hungarian 
law nor the European law that has become part of Hungarian legal order as a 
consequence of the Accession Treaty’s–Act XXX of 2004–Article 2 or the 
acquis, its verdict must be based on the Constitution alone. Unconstitutionality 
can therefore only be determined if a Hungarian legal act is in conflict with the 
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Hungarian Constitution. In the case of conflict regular courts naturally have 
no qualms about applying European law based on the primacy of Community 
law. But for the Constitutional Court the situation is different.  
 4. Though in the professional literature there have been proponents of the 
view that based on the ECJ’s practice European law is even above the member 
states’ constitutions1–and this is reinforced by the TCE’s Article I-6–the signifi-
cance of the issues is too great to be decided merely by an interpretation of the 
TCE Article I-6. In our opinion such a fundamental issue of principle can only 
be decided by the member states’ constitutions themselves, they are the only 
ones who can decide to raise European law above themselves. It is only the 
Constitution itself which can constitute a public power above itself.2 This 
presumes, however, that the public power and its legal order stand even above the 
Hungarian constitutions, above the member states’ constitutions, since European 
law cannot be measured by the constitutional standards of the member states.  
 Especially not since they were not created for this policy objective, thus 
the comparison with them is a conceptual non-sequitur. It is also practically 
impossible to expect that European law be compatible with national constitu-
tions since–assuming a subordinate position–this would enable Constitutional 
Courts to “tear apart” European law as they see fit (by declaring it incompatible 
with their respective constitutions). Though the idea of European law being 
above the constitutions (its priority over them), is clearly deducible from the 
ECJ’s practice, and the TCE’s Article I-6 also contains this point unequivocally 
now, based on the presentation of the previously analysed Constitutional Court 
practices and the member states’ constitutional courts’ reservations about this, 
a clear situation in this regard could only emerge if the Hungarian Constitution 
were to be amended in a way that unequivocally states that European law is 
above the Constitution. Due to the TCE’s explicit declaration on the issue settling 
this matter up cannot be delayed any longer.  
 5. Given the lack of an explicit regulation in the Constitution the situation is 
by no means simple.  
  
 1 Horváth, Z.–Ódor, B.: Az Európai Unió Alkotmánya [The Constitution of the 
European Union]. Budapest, 2005. 80; based on the Convention’s text the problem was 
previously brought up by: Czuczai, J.: Utószó. In: Jogalkotás, jogalkalmazás hazánk 
EU-csatlakozása küszöbén [Legislation, application of law before the EU-Accession]. 
Budapest, 2003. 150. 
 2 See Vörös, I.:  Az EU-csatlakozás alkotmányjogi: jogdogmatikai és jogpolitikai aspek-
tusai [Constitutional law: legal dogmatic and legal policy aspects of the EU-Accession]. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny 57 (2002) 397. 
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 5.1. One probable scenario in the first of the two cases outlined above is 
that the Constitutional Court will conclude that the directive’s faulty trans-
position is an unconstitutional failure to act and will thus–in addition to declaring 
the respective statute unconstitutional and repealed–obligate the lawmaker to 
fulfil its legislative duties and by a specific deadline create a new regulation 
that is compatible with European law.  
 According to the Constitution currently in force, declaring unconstitutionality 
cannot be based on Article 2/A, but only on the Constitution’s Article 7 (1), which 
prescribes the compatibility of Hungarian law with international law. Referring 
to this paragraph would be in order in as far as the Accession Treaty in itself is 
an international legal treaty, and should therefore in principle be compatible 
with the law that is subject to constitutional review. European law itself, 
however, which through Article 2 of the Accession Treaty continuously keeps 
seeping into Hungarian law (for instance through the adoption of directives/-
framework law by European lawmakers), does not qualify as international law.3  
 The possibility of direct conflict with the Hungarian Constitution does not 
even arise, as the given Hungarian statute is not in direct conflict with the 
Accession Treaty (international law), but only indirectly through the European 
law that flows in as a result of the treaty. Given the lack of a rule concerning 
primacy, the first example of case law introduced above poses a poses a real 
theoretical-dogmatic challenge to the Hungarian Constitutional Court.  
 5.2. But the second case is by no means an easy bit to chew for the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, either. For the reasons cited above one cannot 
refer to an infringement of the Constitution when one has (or should have) to 
decide on the compatibility with TEC Article 108. In addition, since this is not 
the misimplementation of a directive, the question of a constitutional infringe-
ment caused by a failure to act does not even arise. The legal instruments 
mentioned in the first case (requesting a preliminary ruling from the ECJ in a 
regular court procedure or notifying the Commission to request an intervention 
at the ECJ) are useless in this instance.  
 5.3. The cornerstone of the Constitutional Court’s expected decision will 
be an interpretation of the Constitution’s Article 2/A, which according to the 
unanimous opinion of academic literature on the subject is equivocal, badly 
designed and offers a confusing regulation concerning the transfer of 
competencies.4 The two cases could have the consequence of almost provoking 
the creation of rules concerning the issue of primacy between the Constitution 
  
 3 See the analysis of European law as a sui generis law distinct from international 
law in: Vörös: op. cit.  
 4 See for example Czuczai: Utószó. op. cit. 135. 
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and European law. Such a rule could provide the basis for future decisions of the 
Constitutional Court in similar cases that are likely to arise. As long as there is 
no such rule in the Constitution, in my opinion it is impossible for a law to give 
a mandate to the Constitutional Court to request a preliminary ruling from the 
European Court of Justice (currently such an authorisation does not exist).  
 6. Very probably serious difficulties can be expected with respect to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the TCE’s Part II. Though the Charter of it is 
compatible with the member states’ own constitutional traditions, its significance 
is so massive that it will impact member states’ constitutional court practices.  
 The problem is that the Hungarian Constitution is well-drafted in the area 
of formulating the basic constitutional right to social security, for instance, It 
contains a sufficiently, but not overly detailed regulation (Constitution Article 
70/E). In its practice the Constitutional Court applies a rather limited inter-
pretation of this regulation and does not consent to the indeterminate, boundless 
expansion of this right (for instance the right to housing). According to the 
Constitutional Court there is no constitutional right for anyone to receive a 
certain type or amount of social provision, either. The right to a social security 
consists on the one hand of the state’s obligation to secure the citizens’ physical 
existence through social benefits, and on the other hand of organising and 
operating the social insurance/social security system and associated institutions 
42/2000 [(XI. 8.) Decision of the Constitutional Court, ABH 2000. 329]. The 
lawmaker has significant freedoms in determining the concrete content of these 
constitutional obligations and in drafting the corresponding laws, a specific 
vision of these contents is not part of the fundamental right to social security.  
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights could be likened to a “colourful 
bouquet” consisting of everything, the contents of which have been collected 
by its makers on the great “field” of European fundamental rights. It contains 
all of the imaginable fundamental rights–such as for example the right to 
“good” (?) administrative processing (Article II-101), or the right to “found a 
family” (Article II-69), which allows for numerous interpretations. The social 
(Article II-94) and other rights secured by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
go well beyond the member states’ constitutions’ own conception and funda-
mental rights content.  
 This is not a problem in itself since the Charter–as pointed out above–can 
only be applied in the context of implementing Union law and in harmony with 
the member states’ common constitutional traditions. This limitation only 
applies, however, if the Charter recognises a fundamental right derived from 
common traditions [Article II-112 (4)]. In any case, some of the Charter of 
Fundamental Right’s formulations approximate political declarations and–no 
matter how noble they may be–they are often oblivious of the social and 
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economic policy realities. Therefore, as a consequence of the increasing presence 
and appearance of the European context in the fundamental rights issue, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights could have an undesired compulsory effect on 
the member states’ constitutional court practice as well.  
 It is a requirement according to the principles of rule of law and due process 
that the TCE’s text be useful for real application: a formulation that is 
reminiscent of a political declaration is very difficult to predict in terms of the 
consequences it engenders. 
 
 
II. The problems of lawmaking  
 
1. For legislators in the member states future problems may not only stem from 
the faulty transposition of a directive or a future framework law, but they may 
even arise from a faultless transposition.  
 1.1. The European law’s sui generis nature manifests itself in the sources of 
law as well, since the directive–in terms of its content–cannot be considered a 
“true” source of law from the vantage point of continental European conception 
of the law, or from the perspective of lawmaking. The European state formation 
resulting from integration is an institution that is conceptually closely tied to the 
law–it mirrors the novelty of the “Staatenverbund”, its incomprehensibility and 
unfathomable nature in terms of traditional constitutional law and sources of law 
categories.  
 1.2. If we talk of a “Staatenverbund” and boldly stop ourselves from 
demanding traditional criteria of statehood, then of course it will be under-
standable and easily acceptable that there are institutions among the sources of 
law that (while prescribing legislative obligations to the member states) are in 
themselves in legal technical terms nothing more than–severed from the 
constitutional context above–a guiding working paper or a draft.  
 But the directive/framework law cannot be separated from the process of 
creating a historically unique state formation. This is exactly what it corresponds 
to, what it reflects. More specifically its sui generis peculiarity, namely that is 
mixed: in part and fundamentally it develops on an intergovernmental basis, 
but the supranational elements are growing. In other words their proportion 
changes in the course of permanent, continuous evolution.  
 One of the basic areas of development is continuous legal harmonisation: 
it is no surprise therefore that in the areas characterised by intergovernmental 
co-operation–if these areas can at all be separated, probably only on a theoretical 
level, of course–the indirect European lawmaking, legal harmonisation through 
directives/framework laws, plays a fundamentally important role.  
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 The contradiction therefore, between the working paper as a source of 
law, its legal character, is only apparent: substantively it is a working paper, 
but legally it is a binding instrument requiring legislation. This is exactly the 
peculiarity that adequately portrays, mirrors this particular European integration 
attempt; it is a good expression of the legal taxonomy and source of law 
manifestation of this odd mix of intergovernmental and supranational elements. 
 1.3. The directive’s/framework law’s source of law character remains 
unchanged in the TCE [Article I-33 (1)] as compared to TEC Article 249. The 
framework law is itself a legislative act that sets binding objectives for all member 
states but leaves the choice of tools and forms of fulfilment up to them.  
 1.4. The ECJ very rarely requires the verbatim transposition of directives 
(Case C-339/87. Commission v. Netherlands [1990] ECR I-851. Points 26–28). 
 In practice directives are published with such content that the lawmakers in 
the member states hardly have any wiggle room in freely choosing the tools 
and forms of complying with them. Legislators are in effect often compelled to 
just take the text of the directive and use it without the slightest modification, 
which can have rather adverse effects for the member states’ law in terms of 
taxonomy. But of course it is also true that the bureaucracies in the member 
states’ ministries tend towards investing the least amount of work possible in 
fulfilling the task of drafting legislation. 
 1.5. The constant modifications resulting from transposition distort the given 
member state’s original legal policy and dogmatic approach because elements 
that are alien to the system disrupt the thought process underlying the. The 
transposition lead to such a confused mass of legal regulations that are to some 
degree determined by member states’, and in some part by European legal 
policy considerations.  
 As these are not even remotely identical–in fact the directives become 
necessary to ensure that the European legal policy ideas are enforced in the 
member states’ legal orders–the law originally based on a coherent, uniform 
legislative concept falls apart into several, often clearly distinct parts. This 
increasing internal inconsistency growing over time makes it harder for the 
law to be applied by member state courts and other authorities, not to mention 
the fact that it becomes harder for those addressed by the law–natural and legal 
persons–to voluntarily shape their behaviour to comply voluntarily with the 
requirements of the law.  
 Before our very eyes the insurance act or our act on international private 
law fall apart, for instance, as a consequence of the Hungarian legislators’ 
compulsory activities.  
 2. But the European lawmaker can also cause numerous problems: I refer 
to the guidelines and notices issued by European authorities and agencies. These 
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notices, etc., naturally lack a legally binding force, they “merely” inform the 
“subjects” in the name of the agency how the agency will proceed in applying 
the statute.  
 2.1. The Directorate-General for Competition is especially active in 
implementing competition law, which affects the “heart” of European economic 
law and its most important issues. It did not only issue a statement on minor 
cartels, but also provided guidelines concerning block exemptions, which is 
of fundamental importance with respect to cartel prohibition; the guidelines 
pertained to EC Regulation 2790/1999 on block exemptions in respect of 
vertical restrictions of market competition, as well as to EC regulation 1/2003, 
which is the backbone of community competition law.5 The bureaucracies’ 
astounding practice then multiplies, the various documents feed on each other: 
they issue notices on modifying previous notices…. 
 2.2. Two officials argued for instance in the professional literature that the 
“guideline” issued in connection with EC Regulation 1/2003 is necessary as it 
takes up certain questions concerning which there had been no consensus at 
the time the regulation was drafted, and thus they could not be integrated into 
the legal text6…–but the office will nevertheless (!) proceed on the basis of the 
guideline and apply Community law correspondingly! The extensive guidelines 
and notices often do not adhere to the requirements applied to the statute, but 
rather correspond in terms of content to the administrative/public administra-
tion law and administrative instructions issued to subordinated bodies.7 
 2.3. The TCE Article I-33 (1), last phrase integrates this practice into the 
European constitution and thus endows it with the rank of a constitutional 
institution. It states that legislative acts termed “recommendations” and “opinions” 
by the TCE do not have binding force. This naturally fails to resolve the problem 
what it is that they exactly “have”. But making these papers part of the TCE 
also makes it impossible to attack the practices in the ECJ on the grounds of 
“European unconstitutionality”. Theoretically such a complaint would be 
possible with reference to the rule of law so often and emphatically referred to 
in the TCE, if the subject of “unconstitutionality” were not enshrined in the 
European constitution itself. 
  
 5 As a cautionary example we point to a list that includes only a minor part: 
Versenyjog [Competition Law]. Budapest, 2004. 291–292. 
 6 Hossenfelder. S.–Lutz, M.: Die neue Durchführungsverordnung zu den Artikeln 
81 und 82 EG-Vertrag [The new implementation decree for Articles 81 and 82 of the EC 
Treaty]. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 53 (2003) 125. 
 7 Rittner, F.: Die neuen Guidelines für Vertikalvereinbarungen [The new guidelines 
for vertical agreement]. Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 50 (2000) 831. 
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 2.4. The publication of such sources of law is in sharp contradiction with 
the Hungarian constitutional approach. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, 
in its 60/1992 (XI. 17.) Constitutional Court decision (ABH, 1992, 275) did not 
even investigate the constitutionality of the circulars, guidelines, and notices 
that had become prevalent in Hungarian legal practice–as tools of anti-demo-
cratic control–under the party dictatorship between 1947–1989, as those do not 
qualify as statutes in the Hungarian legal system according to Act XI of 1987 
on lawmaking. And the Constitutional Court only reviews the constitutionality of 
laws. They are simply not suitable for review by the Constitutional Court. In 
this verdict the Constitutional Court condemned in sharp terms this inherently 
unconstitutional practice embraced by the authorities–but the practice has no 
legal effect at all. From this often-cited landmark decision that is considered a 
key precedent it could be concluded that the authorities have no right to inform 
the addressees about the practices they plan to follow in the future and about 
the factors that inform their decision-making, since they have to apply the law and 
not their own notices. By publishing the decision-making criteria the authorities–
the executive power–really usurps the competencies of the legislative power–
without adequate legal authorisation to do so, of course. 
 2.5. The situation is the same in European law: issuing notices and guidelines–
recommendations and opinions according to the TCE’s Article I-33 (1) last 
phrase and Article I-35 (3)–brings the danger that the Union authorities will 
replace the European legal acts and legal order with their own interpretation–
which extends far beyond legal application–and thus with this mere publication 
influence the behaviour of addresses as if they had issued quasi-legal acts.  
 Thus lawmaking and the application of the law become mixed up and the 
separation between two distinct branches of power become blurred. This is a 
serious violation of the democratic principle of separation of powers. (This is 
exactly how Rittner assesses the practices concerning community competition 
law.8)  
 This European constitutional law phenomenon seriously undermines the 
basic principle and concept of rule of law (the rule of law as an “area of 
freedom, security and justice”) as it is currently laid down in TEU Article 6, 
enshrined as a basic value in the TCE preamble and in Article I-2, and formulated 
as a key Union objective in Article I-3 (1) of the TCE. This phenomenon violates 
the constitutional principle of rule of law because it seriously endangers and 
violates due process in the Union. The reverse side of the coin only serves to 
  
 8 Rittner, F.: Das neue europäische Kartellrecht: bürokratische Netze statt Herrschaft des 
Gesetzes? [The New European Cartel Law: Bureaucratic Webs instead of Rule of Law?] 
Orientierungen zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik. 2004.  
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underline our concerns. It was precisely the ECJ which quite resolutely espoused 
the position that the member states’ authorities’ “circulars”–which in the given 
case were compatible with the directive, by the way–could not be placed on 
the same level as the implementation of a directive and that the implementation 
could not be replaced by or “redeemable” with such a document.9 In this 
decision the ECJ pointed out that an authority’s practice that was compatible 
with the directive could be easily modified, while–moreover–such a “circular” 
lacked the transparency and publicity required by the rule of law.  
 From the above one could arrive at the conclusion that the “recommen-
dations” and “opinions” raised to constitutional level by the TCE are neither 
compatible with the rule of law, which is considered one of the core values 
and basic objectives of the EU and the European legal order, nor with the 
constitutional requirement of due process, as derived from the rule of law. The 
TCE’s inconsistent, internally contradictory regulation in this regard can exert 
a negative effect on the Hungarian Constitution and constitutional thinking. The 
Hungarian authorities’ aforementioned practice is gravely unconstitutional in 
itself; but if they themselves were to issue recommendations in reference to 
community competition law based on EC Regulation 1/2003, for instance, then 
according to TCE Article I-33 (1) they would proceed lawfully and constitu-
tionally, but at the same time they would violate the TCE’s Preamble, its 
Articles I-2 and I-3, as well as the Hungarian Constitution. Given the TCE’s 
adopted text we cannot offer any solutions to this problem, but we thought it 
was important to draw attention to it.  
 
 
III. The legal dogmatic and taxonomic problems of European law  
  as a branch of law 
 
1. A significant portion of the problems outlined above undoubtedly have their 
origins in broader contexts. The introduction in part I of this study of the need, 
in fact burning necessity, of creating the TCE–and of the related developments–
in some sense “advanced” the notion that the European constitutional legislators 
not only wanted to quantitatively amass the “Treaties” constituting primary 
European law into a unitary framework, but that they wanted to created 
something qualitatively novel. One key goal was to achieve clarity, to get rid 
of the confusions and overlaps. At the same time the TCE seeks to further 
develop integration, the Union undoubtedly makes a leap forward towards 
  
 9 Case C-315/98. Commission v. Italian Republic [1999] ECR I-8001. 
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developing the political union (for example limiting the veto right, dual majority 
and strengthening the role of the European Parliament).  
 The need for a quality summation is not formulated with regards to European 
legal order, though it appears that there would be great need for it. On the 
remaining pages we will attempt to address the question of what European 
law is, as the basic law of which the European constitutional legislators have 
drafted, adopted and recommended to the member states for adoption the TCE? 
What is European law in terms of taxonomy and the branch of law it belongs to?  
 What are we talking about when we refer to European or Union law? 
 2. It is true that the subdivision and classification of this field of law and 
legislation can still be regarded as an open issue. The problems already begins 
with the concepts in EU law/EC law, the lack of a basis for distinguishing 
Union law and Community law.  
 The professional literature seeks to bridge the problem by assuming that 
Community law is the sum of first pillar laws, while Union law consists of 
the laws in the second and third pillars.10 Correspondingly, one could talk of 
Union law narrowly understood (as law enshrined in the second and third 
pillars), or Union law more broadly, which would comprise both Union law 
narrowly understood and Community law (in this interpretation Union law 
broadly understood would obviously be a cover concept devoid of real content).  
 The confusion is increased rather than mitigated by the fact that the TCE 
itself uses the terminus technicus “Union’s law” [e.g. Article I-9 (3)]. 
 Considering the fact that next to the unclear terms “European law”/“EU 
law”/“EC law” other terms have began to spring up, such as for instance 
“Community/European company law”, “Community/European competition 
law”,11 European economic law,12 or “European private law”–which even boasts 
its own journal–we need to ask the following question.  
 How can the continuously expanding, ever larger and irrepressibly growing 
legislation be systematised and interpreted as legislation, or maybe even as a 
separate branch of law? The question is evident: are the criteria and conceptual 
framework of a traditional branch of law still useful in this case; and if yes, then 
with what content? 
  
 10 See for example Schweitzer, M.–Hummer, W.: Europarecht [European Law]. 5th 
edition. Berlin, 1996.  
 11 e.g. Mestmäcker, E.-J.–Schweitzer, H.: Europäisches Wettbewerbsrecht [European 
Competition Law]. 2nd edition.  München, 2004. 
 12 Zäch, R.: Grundzüge des Europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts [Fundamentals of European 
Economic Law]. 2nd edition. Zürich, 2005. 
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 What does the concept of “European law” mean today and especially after 
the drafting and adoption of the TCE (regardless of the ratification process and 
the results of the referenda)? 
 Let us consider some examples.  
 Regulations in the European Community company law aim to secure the 
legal safeguards for the exercise of the basic freedom to settle and start business 
anywhere; thereby they protect and maintain the unity of the internal market 
from this perspective. The primary legal policy purpose of European company 
law therefore is not the codification of all company types (for example the 
form of a public limited-liability company).  
 Community competition law does not move within the traditional frame-
work of competition law/competition law: the objective of its legal policy is 
not to protect the freedom of competition from attempts to curb it, but primarily 
to protect, maintain and secure the unity of the internal market. The ECJ’s 
well-known verdict in Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt13 addresses this issue 
specifically.  
 2.1. Initially the European integration process was geared towards creating 
a customs union, then an internal market, and then with time it moved further 
to envision achieving economic union. The continual progress, realisation and 
deepening of the economic union, especially the creation of the common 
currency, increasingly shifted the economic/commercial law character of the 
integration process into the direction of political union. This inevitably 
brought to the forefront and strengthened the public law and constitutional 
aspects of integration–which had been present in traces already at the outset. 
 Though the legislation customarily referred to as EU institutional law was 
characterised by strong constitutional features from the beginning on, and the 
concept of “European constitutional law” popped up as well,14 it was hardly 
possible to identify a separate constitutional law branch in European law, in 
the sense the term is traditionally understood in nation-state/member state 
law. At least not if we see the criteria of traditional legal branches in the 
homogeneity of the subject matter of regulation and the method of regulation.  
 2.2. The difficulties begin already with the fact the European law is not 
the legal order of a state, but of–for a lack of a better word–what the German 
Constitutional Court has termed “Staatenverbund”. Even today this is an 
unprecedented experiment in European history whose objective is to create a 
sui generis European economic and political union. As the polity itself cannot 
be dogmatically, and from a state theory perspective, be identified with a 
  
 13 Case C-14/68 Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1. 
 14 Europäisches Verfassungsrecht. op. cit.  
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traditional state in terms of legal dogma or state theory, its legal order cannot 
be understood in the traditional nation-state/member state categories either. 
The two types of legal policy approaches and objectives are too different.  
 The more or less dominant theoretical approach that considers the EU an 
autonomous legal order15–and holds that European law is neither nation-state 
nor international law but a sui generis legal order–makes such an interpre-
tation, categorisation and systematisation impossible in any case. 
 3. The EU legal order and its further development was first based on the 
establishment of economic union and was then increasingly driven by the goal 
of creating political union. This determines the legislation’s dual policy 
objectives and dual nature. Correspondingly–in a somewhat simplified manner–
the economic union’s legal policy objectives were geared towards the achieve-
ment and preservation of a single internal market.  
 The creation, maintenance and further development of political union, 
however, was (again somewhat simplified) determined by the legal policy 
objective that sought to determine at each stage the respective proportions of 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism–always with respect to the current 
social/political possibilities, needs and necessities.  
 3.1. The difficulty of the problem is exemplified by the structure of the 
various monographs dealing with European law. The comprehensive treatises 
simply put the European legislation side-by-side, but quietly acknowledge that 
this legislation in reality more or less develops based on the possibilities 
offered by everyday politics, by the perspectives current political considera-
tions bring to the issue. Its formation, development, expansion and content are 
determined by political will formation, the ability to find consensus. The result 
is that it develops not with the systematic/dogmatic conceptions of a unified 
nation-state, but more as a patchwork, thus to a significant degree dependent 
on chance.  
 One cannot expect European law to have an immanent system quality–with 
the taxonomic quality that is present in the national legal orders of nation-
states–a real, overarching conception of legal branches that is composed of 
different legal branches.  
 Let us consider some other examples! 
 The “Handbuch des EG-Wirtschaftsrechts”16 edited by Dauses and Zäch’s 
previously mentioned „Grundzüge des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts”17 are 
  
 15 Vörös: op. cit. III. 3.3. 
 16 Dauses, M. (ed.): Handbuch des EG-Wirtschaftsrechts [Manual of EC Economic 
Law]. München, 2002. 
 17 Zäch: op. cit.  
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just as incapable of realising their undertaking without exploring the so-called 
institutional/organisational law–that is the constitutional aspects par excellence–
as Nicolaysen’s work on the same legislation18, which carries the subheading 
“European Integration Constitution” itself. The same constitutional issues (among 
others) are discussed in the standard work by Craig–de Búrca, which none-
theless bears the title “EU Law”. 19 
 3.2. Designating the field of law as sui generis may be appropriate, but 
cannot conceal the fact that the scientists who came up with the term ‘sui generis’ 
had no clue themselves as to what is that they are talking about. Developing 
the contours of political union and stabilising it specifically requires that the 
concept be endowed with specific meaning. 
 From the diverse studies, monographs and analyses on the subject it 
becomes increasingly apparent that a tripartite division is becoming generally 
accepted.  
 a) First: the history of integration; the legal dogmatic and legal policy founda-
tions of European law and its characteristic features, as well the concept of 
European law as unified Union law. 
 b) Second: the two major part of European law today: the institutional/orga-
nisational law (institutions, structure, operation, lawmaking, legislation) and 
the so-called “substantive” law (e.g. competition law, company law, public 
procurement law, penal law).  
 c) Third: the Union policies. 
 Such a tripartite division illustrates at least that today a monograph on 
European law can no longer be just a mass of ten chapter on positive laws lined 
up next to each other. The reasons are threefold.  
 For one, European law has to reflect the dual legal policy objectives of 
preserving and further developing economic and political union, which one 
cannot expect from the legal order of a nation-state, especially since that is not 
even its legal policy function. This consideration suggests that we ought to 
use the greatest caution possible when using traditional categories of legal 
branches, such as for instance European “private law”, “competition law”, 
“company law”, “penal law” or even “constitutional law”. The sui generis content 
of European law and its characteristic features–including its structure and 
categories–are determined by integration and its specific legal policy objectives. 
These legal policy objectives–let us reiterate this–cannot be described (without 
  
 18 Nicolaysen, G.: Europarecht. Die Europäische Integrationsverfassung [The European 
Integration Constitution]. 2nd edition, Baden-Baden, 2002. 
 19 Craig, P.–de Burca, G. (eds.): EU Law. Oxford, 2003. 
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the danger of causing confusion) with reference to the content of the nation-
states’/member states’ legal systems.  
 The distinction drawn between Community law and Union law also in-
creasingly appears artificial, and with the conclusion of the TCE’s ratification–
that is if it is successfully concluded in every member states–it will become 
outmoded. Regardless of the TCE’s actual fate European law must be presented 
and systematised in dogmatic unity. The excessive overlaps between TEU and 
TEC also serve to underline this requirement. 
 Secondly, the well-known distinction between “institutional” and “substantive” 
law is also becoming increasingly questionable.  
 The institutions constitute the EU’s constitutional, more precisely its 
administrative law foundations and structure, naturally including the lawmaking 
and legislative system. 
 But the “substantive” law can no longer be simply reduced to the law on 
the internal market–in other words to the legal guarantees concerning the 
four fundamental freedoms–either. Obviously the four fundamental freedoms 
constitute the absolute core of the EC, whose legal regulation and safeguarding–
from common trade policy to rights to subsidies–far extends beyond merely 
maintaining the internal market narrowly understood and the prevention of 
market distortions. The legislation created in this context–the “law” of the internal 
market–is not “substantive” law, but a more or less coherent sui generis field 
of law, codified around the four fundamental freedoms and following its own 
particular legal policy objectives.  
 “European” competition law, public procurement law, company law or 
the law concerning state subsidies all give legal form to different aspects of 
maintaining, safeguarding and protecting a single internal market; they formulate 
the categorical imperative and legal guarantee of the free movement of goods, 
services and capital, as well as the freedom to settle, countering potential state 
or corporate efforts to distort or inhibit said freedoms. In terms of their legal 
policy context and their objectives, the regulations concerning European company 
law (European Economic Interest Groupings, European Public Limited-Liability 
Company), can be much better understood as implementing executive regulations 
of TEC Article 43–that is the free movement of persons and settlement, as well 
as the safeguarding of the freedom of services–rather than as a form of some 
“real” nation-state commercial law’s codification of company law.  
 From the above it appears to follow that the use of a “European” private 
law, economic law or trade law category would be rather problematic. 
 Finally, an open question still remains: what should happen to the various 
policies in terms of legal dogmatic–where should one put the common first 
pillar trade policy, for example? The strong market protection/administrative 
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aspects of this policy are obvious. But what about the second and third pillars? 
A common trade policy, with its legal policy orientation towards protecting 
the market, its legal/administrative set of tools, as well as its economic diplo-
macy competencies (WTO, etc.) undoubtedly belong to internal market “law”. 
 The other two pillars belong to traditionally understood public law issues. 
But in light of the above the division of European law into “private law” and 
“public law” seems like a rather dubious experiment that I would caution 
anyone from engaging in. Such a division would be extremely unlikely to have 
a convincing legal dogmatic basis, as it would say or express nothing regarding 
the EU’s previously often emphasised own and specific legal policy objectives. 
 4. In my opinion European law could be divided into a general part and a 
special part. These categories obviously do not correspond to a nation-state’s 
legal system’s traditional conceptual criteria concerning general and special 
parts.  
 The general part would deal with the historical development of integration, 
as well as the foundations and objectives of the EU’s social, economic and 
legal policies. 
 The special part can be further broken down into two parts: First into the 
constitutional foundations (institutions and their operation, lawmaking and 
legislation, the legal nature of European law, the second and third pillar policies) 
realising the political union. Secondly, it would incorporate the subpart on the 
legal safeguards for preserving the single internal market and the realisation of 
the economic union which, in a systematic perspective, would summarise these 
safeguards’ various aspects and legal institutions embedded in a mutually 
referential context.  
 
* * * 
 
In our opinion the presentation of the TCE and the analysis of its effects makes 
it inevitable to take a look at the fate of European law as well. A dogmatic 
rethinking of the European legal system is a task, however, that the Hungarian 
and European legal scholarship and legal practice–including the legislators–
will have to face up to as soon as possible, regardless of the TCE’s political 
fate and its substitution with the planned Reform Treaty.  
 
